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Abstract
The Minority Game framework was recently generalized to account for the possi-
bility that agents adapt not only through strategy selection but also by diversifying
their response according to the kind of dynamical regime, or the risk, they perceive.
Here we study the effects of this mechanism in different information structures. We
show that both the stationary macroscopic properties and the dynamical features
depend strongly on whether the information supplied to the system is exogenous
(‘random’) or endogenous (‘real’). In particular, in the latter case one observes that
a small amount of herding tendency suffices to alter the collective behavior dramat-
ically. In such cases, the dynamics is characterized by the creation and destruction
of trends, accompanied by intermittent features like volatility clustering.
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1 Introduction
The Minority Game (MG) and related models allowed to elucidate many as-
pects of the critical behavior of systems of heterogeneous inductive agents,
with special emphasis on financial markets, by addressing directly the inter-
play between microscopic behavior and macroscopic properties – including
fluctuations, market impact, predictability and efficiency – in rather elemen-
tary and often exactly solvable settings [1–3]. Besides providing a surprisingly
rich description of the phase structure of an idealized speculative market [4],
MG-based models are also able to reproduce to some extent the empirical
price statistics (the so-called ‘stylized facts’ [5]) of financial markets [6–8].
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However, the emergence of the peculiar dynamical regimes characterizing real
systems, with intermittent fluctuation outbursts (volatility clustering) and the
formation and destruction of trends, is only partially captured by standard
MGs. This is in part due to the fact that the critical window where empirical
phenomenology is observed typically shrinks as the system size increases, indi-
cating that stylized facts would require a significant amount of fine tuning of
the parameters and ultimately marginal efficiency [6]. Moreover, the dynam-
ics of these models usually displays a strong dependence on both the disorder
sample and the initial conditions [9]. It would therefore be desirable to devise
a simple microscopic mechanism that is able to generate a realistic dynamical
structure in a robust way while preserving the fundamental physical content
of MGs.
Several studies in financial market microstructure suggest that these peculiar-
ities emerge from the coexistence of different types of traders, and point the
attention especially on ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘chartists’ [10–17]. The former
trade on the spread between the actual and the expected price (the ‘funda-
mental’) trying to profit from fluctuations; the latter look for trends in the
price history and follow the expected drift. The common picture has it that in
market phases dominated by fundamentalists the price follows the fundamen-
tal, whereas when chartist pressure prevails trends deviating from the funda-
mental (bubbles) occur. Moreover, switches between the two phases, during
which agents revise their expectations over a certain time span, are possibly
accompanied by activity outbursts.
The expectations of agents in MGs are implicitly encoded in the reinforce-
ment term of the learning dynamics. They are usually fixed: agents behave as
fundamentalists in MGs and as chartists in Majority Games [18–21]. To imple-
ment the mechanism discussed above means therefore to modify the learning
process so as to allow agents to change their expectations, and hence their
character, in time according to the market conditions they perceive. One pos-
sible way to do this was introduced in [22]. In a nutshell, the idea is that when
price movements are small agents should try to look for profit opportunities
in emerging trends while when large price changes occur they should perceive
a greater risk as the market behaves more chaotically, and return to a more
cautious conduct. The passage from one attitude to the other is provided by
a parameter that tunes the agents’ risk-sensitivity – or the trade-off between
expected profit and perceived risk – so that when price movements exceed
a given threshold the risk perceived by agents is large and they play a MG
(that is, they select strategies that effectively try to follow the fundamen-
tal) preferentially. When coupled to a random external information structure,
this mechanism was shown to lead to the formation of ‘heavy tails’ in the
distribution of returns in a large ‘critical’ window where a crossover from a
fundamentalist-dominated to a trend-followers dominated market takes place.
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Here we discuss this setting further by considering a somewhat simpler but
more transparent model in order to address the role of the information struc-
ture, particularly on the system dynamics. This is an especially crucial point
in analyzing the interaction between trend-followers and contrarians, since
trend-following behavior is expected to introduce a strong bias in the endoge-
nous information dynamics. We will indeed see that a small trend-following
attitude is sufficient to drastically change both the typical stationary-state
macroscopic properties and the single-sample dynamical properties with re-
spect to the random information case. We will proceed by adding increasingly
complex information structures to the simplest possible model (without infor-
mation), which is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3 the case of random
external information is considered while in Section 4 we address the case of
‘real’ endogenous information. Finally, we formulate some concluding remarks
in Section 5.
2 The simplest model (without information)
Let us consider the following setup. Each of N agents (i = 1, . . . , N) must
decide whether to buy (ai(t) = 1) or sell (ai(t) = −1) at each time step
t = 0, 1, . . .. The success of agent i at time t is measured by the payoff function
πi(t) = ai(t)A(t)f [A(t)] (1)
where A(t) =
∑
i ai(t) is the aggregate bid (or ‘excess demand’, which serves
as a proxy for price movements). The function f encodes the type of game be-
ing played and, implicitly, the agents’ expectations. If f is a constant, agents
are either playing a Majority Game (for f > 0, πi > 0 if i acts according
to the majority) or a Minority Game (for f < 0, πi > 0 if i acts according
to the minority). Agents thus behave as trend-followers in the former case
and as fundamentalists in the latter. We want to address a more general case
in which agents are able to modify their character depending on the size of
market fluctuations. We assume that they behave as trend-followers (resp. fun-
damentalists) when price movements are small (resp. large) and the perceived
risk is small (resp. large). The simplest function for our scope is perhaps
f(x) = χ (|x| < L)− χ (|x| > L) (2)
where χ(B) = 1 if B is true (and 0 otherwise) and L is a threshold, so that
then |A(t)| < L agents perceive the game as a Majority Game, whereas for
|A(t)| > L they revert to a Minority Game. For the sake of simplicity, in what
follows we assume that L = O(N).
We imagine that in order to make their decisions agents employ the following
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Fig. 1. | 〈A〉 |/L (left) and 〈A2〉 /N2 (right) versus Γ for different values of L. Insets:
〈A〉 vs Γ (left) and 〈A2〉 /N2 (right) versus Γ for a pure MG, corresponding to L = 0
(system with N = 1000, averages over 200 disorder samples per value of Γ).
iterated probabilistic rule (a ∈ {−1, 1}):
Prob{ai(t) = a} = e
aUi(t)
2 coshUi(t)
(3)
Ui(t+ 1)− Ui(t) = ΓA(t)f [A(t)]/N (4)
where Γ > 0 is a constant (the ‘learning rate’ of agents) and Ui(0) are inde-
pendent, identically distributed quenched random variables with zero mean
and variance 1 for i = 1, . . . , N 2 , and consider the properties of the steady
state of the dynamics. We will see that, in spite of its extreme simplicity, this
model is sufficient to capture one of the key features induced by this scheme.
Let us see, for a start, the behavior of the time average of the excess demand
〈A〉 (where the average is taken in the steady state of the dynamics). In a
Majority Game (f(x) = 1 or L ≥ N) one finds 〈A〉 6= 0, implying that one of
the two possible actions is systematically preferred (a trend), while 〈A〉 = 0
in a pure MG (f(x) = −1 or L = 0). Intuition suggests that for a sufficiently
small L the latter scenario will dominate, since agents will be extremely risk-
sensitive. On the other hand, for a sufficiently large L agents will be more
risk-prone and a Majority-Game scenario is expected. The crossover between
these two regimes is displayed in Fig. 1. One observes that for small Γ trends
are formed (as in a Majority Game) even for small values of L, wheres for
large Γ the typical excess demand returns to zero (as in a MG) for all L < N .
It is also instructive to look at the crossover in the second moment 〈A2〉,
2 In principle, the parameters L and Γ and the function f itself could be different
for different agents. We however drop this source of heterogeneity in order to focus
on the effects induced by risk sensitivity. On the other hand, it is obvious that
the heterogeneity of initial conditions Ui(0) cannot be dropped, since Ui(t)− Ui(0)
is independent on i for all t and the dynamics would be completely trivial if the
starting point was the same for everybody.
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Fig. 2. 〈A(t)A(t+ 1)〉 /N2 versus L/N for Γ = 1 (left inset), Γ = 3.3 (main plot)
and Γ = 5 (right inset) (system with N = 1000, averages over 200 disorder samples
per value of L/N)
recalling that in a Majority Game, 〈A2〉 is of order N2 for any Γ, while in a
pure MG (see also insets in Fig. 1) 〈A2〉 is of order N for small Γ and becomes
of order N2 for large enough Γ. Finally, a deeper insight may be obtained
from the correlation function 〈A(t)A(t+ 1)〉 (see Fig. 2). For intermediate Γ
excess demands are negatively correlated for low L whereas the correlation
turns positive when L increases, that is as agents become less and less risk
sensitive. The former regime is characteristic of Minority Games, where price
increments are one-step anti-correlated because agents effectively act so as to
compensate price increments in one direction with subsequent increments in
the other direction. The latter regime is instead typical of trends and Majority
Games.
This coexistence of MG-like and of Majority-Game-like features is at odds
with mixed models in which each agent is either a fundamentalist or a chartist
and is not allowed to pass from one group to the other [18,23]. In that case,
the macroscopic properties are essentially determined by the larger group (be
it fundamentalists or trend-followers), whose expectations are fulfilled. Here,
the risk sensitivity determines which group of traders dominates and mixed
phenomenology occurs in a range of values of the learning rate Γ. While the
detailed physical picture becomes more articulate, this conclusion actually
extends to models endowed with more complicated information structure.
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3 Case of random external information
Let us move over to the usual MG setting, namely a system of N agents who
at each time step t must formulate a binary bid (buy/sell) based on some
public information pattern µ(t). One such pattern is given to agents at every
time step; it is assumed that the number of possible patterns is P and that P
scales linearly with N . The relevant control parameter is indeed the relative
number of information patterns α = P/N . In order to translate informations
into bids each agent disposes of S strategies, each one predicting the outcomes
aig = {aµig} (i = 1, . . . , N ; g = 1, . . . , S; µ = 1, . . . , P ), and aims at selecting,
at each time step, the one that delivers him the highest expected profit. If
we denote this optimal strategy as gi(t), the agent’s bid at time t is then
given by a
µ(t)
igi(t)
. As usual, we assume that strategies have quenched random
components drawn independently from {−1, 1} with equal probability. In this
work, we focus on the case S = 2.
The single-agent dynamics is defined by the following rules:
gi(t) = arg max
g
Uig(t)
A(t) =
1√
N
∑
i
a
µ(t)
igi(t)
(5)
Uig(t+ 1)− Uig(t) = aµ(t)ig A(t)f [A(t)]
where each Uig, called the ‘score’ in MG jargon, measures the performance
of strategy g of agent i. At each time step, every agent chooses his best-
performing strategy as the one with the highest score and formulates the
corresponding bid. Subsequently, bids are aggregated into the excess demand
A(t), that we have now normalized for future convenience, and scores are
updated. It is assumed here that scores are initialized at time t = 0 in such
a way that Ui1(0) − Ui2(0) = 0 for all i and g (‘unbiased’ or ‘flat’ initial
conditions). We will not address here the important and subtle issues of if and
how the steady state changes when a non-zero initial bias is used.
In this Section, the information structure is assumed to correspond to the
random external case: µ(t) is an integer drawn randomly and independently
at each time step from {1, . . . , P} with uniform probability [24]. In this case
the model is Markovian and the information dynamics covers uniformly the
state space {1, . . . , P}. As for f , we can borrow the recipe employed in the
previous section and set:
f(x) = χ (|x| < η)− χ (|x| > η) (6)
where η > 0 is a tunable constant (notice that A(t) is of order 1 in this case).
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Different choices are also possible. For example, linearizing (6) one obtains
f(x) = η − |x| (7)
which is equally well suited for our purposes. The main difference with the
piecewise constant case lies in the fact that payoffs (which, we remind, are
proportional to A(t)f [A(t)]) are a non-linear function of the aggregate bid.
Such non-linear choices, one of which was considered in [22], lead to the emer-
gence of a clear non-Gaussian statistics for A(t) at small values of α. Here
we wish to concentrate on the role of information structures and therefore we
may restrict ourselves to the somewhat simpler form (6).
We will analyze the macroscopic properties in the steady state using α and
η as control parameters. Our attention will be mostly focused on: (a) the
volatility σ2 = 〈A2〉 measuring the magnitude of global fluctuations (notice
that 〈A〉 = 0 by construction); (b) the ‘predictability’
H =
1
P
∑
µ
〈A|µ〉2 (8)
where 〈A|µ〉 stands for the time average of A conditioned on the occurrence of
the pattern µ, quantifying the presence of exploitable information (ifH 6= 0 the
minority action can be statistically predicted on the basis of the information
pattern alone at least for some µ); and finally (c) the (normalized) one-step
autocorrelation function D = 〈A(t)A(t+ 1)〉 /σ2, which indicates the domi-
nating component of the market (if D > 0 returns are positively correlated
and trend-followers dominate). Other observables of interest will be defined in
due course.
Numerical results are shown in Fig. 3. One sees that the magnitude of fluctu-
ations increases smoothly with η, as one passes from a MG-like regime where
σ2 can be smaller than the random-trading value 1, signaling a high degree of
coordination among agents, to a Majority-Game-like regime (large η) where
σ2 > 1. Correspondingly, the system displays a transition between an un-
predictable (or ‘symmetric’, low α) regime with H = 0 to a predictable (or
‘asymmetric’, high α) when η is sufficiently small, similarly to what happens
in the MG. Notice that the critical point αc below which H = 0 shifts (contin-
uously) to smaller values as η increases. Clearly, as the agents’ risk threshold
grows their tendency to behave like trend-followers increases and, by herding,
they produce more and more exploitable information (H increases with η) even
for smaller systems. Note that upon increasing η further, one still observes a
(sharp!) MG-like transition at low α, but for high α the predictability tends to
1, as in the Majority Game. The change from one regime to the other at large
α is apparently a threshold phenomenon in η (see Fig. 4) 3 . The coexistence of
3 A similar, though less sharp threshold phenomenon was found for the different
7
0.01 0.1 1 10 100
 α
0.1
1
10
100
σ
2
η = 0.5
η = 0.7
η = 1
η = 2
 η = 10
0.01 0.1 1 10 100
 α
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
102
H η = 0.5
η = 0.7
η = 1
η = 2
η = 10
0.01 0.1 1 10 100
 α
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
φ
η = 0.1
η = 0.5
η = 0.7
η = 1
η = 2
η = 10
Fig. 3. Stationary volatility σ2, predictability H and fraction of frozen agents φ as
a function of α for different values of η. Simulations performed with αN2 = 16000,
with averages over at least 200 disorder samples per point.Every sample corresponds
to a particular realization of the strategies. Numerical results for values of η lower
or larger than those displayed are not visibly different.
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Fig. 4. Stationary predictability as a function of η for different large values of α.
Simulations performed with αN2 = 16000, with averages over 100 disorder samples
per point.
the competing tendencies can also be seen from the fraction of ‘frozen’ agents
(namely, agents for which |Ui1(t) − Ui2(t)| → ∞ as t → ∞, so that they use
though conceptually similar model of [22].
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Fig. 5. Normalized one-step autocorrelation function D as a function of α for dif-
ferent values of η. Simulations performed with αN2 = 16000 and averages over 100
disorder samples per point.
only one of their strategies in the stationary state), φ. For small η, one finds a
pure Minority Game; for intermediate η, φ jumps from the small-α value of 0
(as in the MG) to the large-α value of 1 (as in the Majority Game, where all
agents ultimately freeze [21,23]). Notice that as η decreases φ also decreases,
which implies that when agents become more risk-sensitive it becomes more
difficult for them to identify an optimal strategy. Coming to the the autocor-
relation function D (see Fig. 5), it shows the coexistence of Minority-like and
Majority-like features for intermediate values of η once more. For small η, D
is negative and the dynamics is completely dominated by anticorrelations (i.e.
by contrarians). As η increases positive correlations appear for large α, and
for large η the system is dominated by trend-followers.
In summary, one can say that adding a certain risk-tendency at the micro-
scopic level leads to a loss of global efficiency and that for intermediate values
of η MG-like features coexist with Majority-Game-like features, the former
prevailing at low α. This is again in sharp contrast with the scenario emerging
from mixed Majority-Minority Games, where the expectations of the larger
group (be it fundamentalists or trend-followers) are fulfilled at all α and where
the macroscopic properties are essentially a linear combination of those of the
pure models [23].
It is important to notice that even when the competition between risk-aversion
and profit-maximization is not too strong, for instance in the MG-like phase,
the dynamics acquires several non trivial traits. In Fig. 6 we report the re-
sults from a single realization of the time series of the excess demand A(t) in
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Fig. 6. Excess demand A(t) as a function of the time elapsed from equilibration
conditioned on the presence of three different information patterns (top down) for
a single sample with η = 0.5 and α = 0.05. Bottom figure: price time series for the
same realization. System of N = 565 agents.
correspondence with three different information patterns, and the time series
of the ‘price’ R(t) =
∑
ℓ≤tA(ℓ), both for small α, that is, where MG-like fea-
tures are predominant. One can see that excess demand fluctuations at fixed
µ behave intermittently: periods of high volatility are followed by periods of
low volatility. At the same time, the profile of R(t) shows the formation of
well-defined trends.
4 Case of endogenous information
We now move to the case in which the information pattern µ(t) encodes in
its binary representation the string of the last m losing actions (the ‘history’)
of the market sign[A(t − ℓ)] (ℓ = 1, . . . , m) so that P = 2m. The information
dynamics in this case is deterministic and reads
µ(t+ 1) =


[2µ(t) + 1]mod P if A(t) > 0
[2µ(t)]mod P if A(t) < 0
(9)
Trend-following behavior is expected to influence the macroscopic properties
rather strongly, because of the bias trends would impose on the resulting
history dynamics. We therefore have to take into account the frequency ρ(µ)
with which each string µ is generated in the steady state and modify the
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Fig. 7. Volatility (top) and predictability (bottom) as a function of α for different
values of η. Simulations performed with αN2 = 30000, with averages over 200
disorder samples per point.
definition of the predictability (8) as
H =
∑
µ
ρ(µ) 〈A|µ〉2 (10)
As a measure of the bias (or of the information content) of the frequency
distribution one typically employs the entropy
S = −∑
µ
ρ(µ) logP ρ(µ) (11)
which is normalized in such a way that for the random case discussed above,
ρ(µ) = 1/P and S = 1.
Numerical results for the volatility σ2 and the predictability H (see Fig. 7)
show that already for small values of η (e.g. η = 0.1) the behavior deviates
greatly from the one found in the case of exogenous information. In fact,
while there is no evidence of a symmetric regime, fluctuations for small α are
much smaller than in the MG-regime. A detailed analysis of the volatility as a
function of η for small α (see Fig. 8) suggests that as soon as agents allow for
a small amount of risk-proneness fluctuations decrease sharply, though their
value may vary significantly from sample to sample. It is important to notice
that since N is odd, the minimum possible value of |A(t)| is η∗ = 1/√N
(which corresponds to η∗ ≃ 0.043 for the simulations of Fig. 8). For η < η∗
agents are always playing a MG which leads to large fluctuations in the low α-
phase, given the flat initial conditions. As soon as the risk thereshold exceeds
η∗ and agents have a chance to herd fluctuations become significantly smaller.
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System with N = 547. The dashed vertical line marks the value η∗ corresponding
to the minimum possible value of |A(t)|.
This remarkable effect, together with the fact that the predictability is small,
indicates that relatively efficient states can be reached. As η increases further
σ2 increases smoothly until it eventually reaches its standard Majority-Game
value. (Note that the next smallest possible values of |A(t)| are 3/√N , 5/√N
etc.; for η in-between these values the stationary volatility is roughly constant).
Thus, we see that the effects due to herding are much more pronounced in the
presence of real histories with respect to the case of random information.
Loosely speaking, one could say that a small amount of greediness at the
microscopic level may turn out to have positive effects at the macroscopic
level. The toll to pay is the reduction of informational efficiency. This is yet
another proof of the fact that the interplay between these two properties may
be considerably subtle in these systems. However larger risk thresholds lead
to a serious loss of global efficiency. For large α, instead, the model behaves as
a pure MG. As η increases, the pressure of trend-followers gets stronger and
the model acquires more and more the character of a Majority Game.
Analyzing the fraction of frozen agents (see Fig. 9) one sees that for small
α almost all agents are frozen at the interesting values of η, so that even
individual agents actually profit from a small greediness. Surprisingly, however,
φ tends to the MG-like behavior when α increases. This is in striking contrast
to the observations made for the model with exogenous information, in which
MG-like features prevail at small α when coexisting with Majority-type of
features. The results for the autocorrelation function D confirm that indeed a
small η is sufficient to induce strong herding effects for small α, at odds with
the previous case.
Let us now look at the history dynamics. The entropy S is reported in Fig.
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Fig. 9. Fraction of frozen agents (top) and normalized one-step autocorrelation
function (bottom) as a function of α for different values of η. Simulations performed
with αN2 = 30000, with averages over 200 disorder samples per point.
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Fig. 10. Entropy as a function of α for different η. Simulations performed with
αN2 = 30000, with averages over 200 disorder samples per point.
10. First of all, for sufficiently small η the scenario of a pure MG should be
reproduced, where S = 1 for α < αc ≃ 0.34 and S < 1 (slightly) for α < αc.
This is indeed the case, as can be seen even from Fig. 11, where we plot the
steady-state distribution of history frequencies relative to the uniform case:
Q(f) =
1
P
∑
µ
δ[f − Pρ(µ)] (12)
(if ρ(µ) = 1/P for all µ, Q(f) is a delta-distribution at f = 1). As η increases
the entropy drops seriously for small α as herding trivializes the history dy-
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Fig. 11. Relative distribution of frequencies Q(f) for η = 0.01 at α = 0.1 (top) and
α = 2 (bottom). Simulations performed with αN2 = 30000, with averages over 100
disorder samples per point.
namics. For large α, again, the MG behavior is recovered. As η increases and
trend-following becomes more and more preferred, S consistently tends to be
much smaller than 1 as only a small fraction of histories are generated per
sample. However, a glance at the single sample behavior suffices to under-
stand that the dynamics is much more complex than the entropy would and
could tell (see Fig. 12). For small η and small α one distinctly observes volatil-
ity clustering in the time series of A(t). Periods of low volatility correspond
to a trend, as shown by the distribution Q(f) relative to those intervals. Here,
the game has the character of a Majority Game and trend-followers dominate.
Periods of high volatility correspond instead to a chaotic dynamics where the
history frequency distribution is uniform. Here, the model behaves like a Mi-
nority Game and fundamentalists dominate. The switch from one regime to
the other is essentially driven by random events. Indeed, the duration of the
activity outbursts, as well as that of trends, is arbitrary and may vary strongly
from sample to sample. The sharpness of the switch is instead simply due to
the particular form of the function f we have chosen, as well as to the value of
η. In fact, as one increases η, the magnitude of fluctuations in the Majority-like
periods increases and the different regimes tend to merge.
5 Conclusion
The simple microscopic mechanism introduced in our model, when coupled
to real information, determines significant effects in the stationary macro-
14
Fig. 12. Single sample excess demand as a function of the time elapsed from equili-
bration for η = 0.06 (top) and α = 0.1. Relative frequency distribution Q(f) for the
same realization in the different regimes (bottom). Inset: ‘price’ R(t) as a function
of time.
scopic properties and produces realistic dynamical features such as volatility
clustering. These results, together with the observations made in [22] on the
statistics of price changes, show that generalized MGs reveal a remarkably
rich and realistic behavior which has been only partially uncovered so far. By
all means, we believe that the statistical mechanics of systems of interacting
trend-followers and contrarians constitute an extremely challenging problem
for physicists and are definitely worth more detailed investigations. Of course,
an analytical solution would be welcome. To conclude we would like to indi-
cate an issue that is, in our opinion, particularly interesting, namely seeing
how this scenario would change if the risk-threshold were allowed to fluctuate
in time. The most intuitive way to do that is perhaps to couple the threshold’s
dynamics to the system performance. A possible microscopic mechanism could
be the following. When η is large a high volatility is to be expected as agents
are more likely to behave as trend-followers. As a consequence, they should
likely reduce their threshold since the market is risky; however, for small η
fundamentalists are expected to dominate and the game should acquire a Mi-
nority character. Hence the predictability will be smaller and there will be
less profit opportunities. Agents may then decide to adopt a larger threshold
to seek for convenient speculations on a wider scale. If these two competing
effects are appropriately described by an evolution equation for η, the system
should self-organize around an ‘optimal’ value of the risk threshold. For all
15
practical purposes, the model discussed in this work assumes that such a time
evolution takes place on time scales much longer than those over which trading
occurs.
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